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David Edward Rose 
 
The relevance of Hegelian social thought to 
contemporary conservatism 
 
1. Introduction 
 
On ascending to the leadership of the British Labour Party, Ed Miliband (like 
so many political leaders before him) sought to break from the past, openly stating 
in several interviews that the era of New Labour was over. The posture of historical 
rupture is both thoroughly modern and, yet in this case, somewhat contradictory. 
Of course, when Miliband asserts that “New” Labour is finished, he does not mean 
that the party will return to “Old” Labour or even, plainly and simply, Labour, but 
he means a new “New” project will begin. He wishes to signal that the past–no 
matter how new–has been surpassed and a new, more modern project has begun. 
Gianni Vattimo's perceptive remark about modernity appears more and more 
pertinent: “... modernity is the epoch in which simply being modern became a 
decisive value in itself.”
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 What is new is always better than what is old and what is 
modern is preferable to what is passé just for the sake of being newer and more 
modern. 
When a new direction is required, contemporary consciousness always 
intuitively looks to the new, but there is an alternative, that is the historical 
consciousness that seeks to continue what has been achieved and to build on and 
from it. The lessons of the past offer political agents guidance rather than merely 
mistakes and political principles emerge not from some theoretical level of a free 
consciousness but at a deep practical level of a situated consciousness submerged 
in culture. However, conservatism as a compelling political theory suffers in the 
contemporary milieu, at the outset, from an attitudinal disadvantage when 
compared to its main theoretical rivals. It is nostalgic and listens to the lessons of 
the past which is so utterly unmodern. And it is, for the most part, the attitude of 
modernity towards what is new and the idea of historical rupture which underpins 
most of the resistance to conservative political theory. So, one would think that if 
we now inhabit what has become, for better or worse, termed the postmodern age, 
then we would happily return to the claims of custom and the motivations of 
nostalgia. However, the past can be as oppressive as the drive to renew and there 
still rightfully exists a mistrust of custom and the authority of history which 
putatively supports liberal political theories at the expense of conservative ones. 
History is littered with oppressive regimes and ideologies that survived simply 
because the individual was bound (usually for the benefit of others) by the 
authority of some mythological past or to some false conception of his or her place 
in the order of things. 
Conservatism must, if it is to be intellectually relevant in the public political 
culture of today, be able to offer a convincing role for the individual, moral 
conscience. Otherwise it is all too easy to dismiss conservative thought on 
theoretical grounds as another form of the irrationalism or shallow relativism of 
postmodern rejections of liberal politics. Furthermore, conservatism would be 
unable to articulate a proper practical account of when the tradition and customs 
need to be changed and, therefore, slide into an unacceptable quietism. The 
following essay contends that Hegelian social thought, and above all the concept of 
Sittlichkeit can form the ground for a rational, critical conservatism. There are three 
tasks facing any attempt to articulate a plausible political conservatism: one, show 
it is possible and plausible (section 3); two, demonstrate why it is preferable to 
liberalism and other theories (section 4); and, three, reject the challenge of political 
quietism (section 5). Hegelian thought can do all three of these in the most overtly 
theoretical way. First, though, it would be pertinent to begin with a short section 
outlining a general theoretical characterization of conservative political theory with 
a few indications about how it coincides with Hegelian thought (section 2).
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2. Conservatism and Hegel's social thought 
 
A conservative political theory ideally exhibits three characteristics: one, 
political scepticism; two, traditionalism; and, three, organicism. Conservative 
theories are sceptical of any political theory derived from abstract reasoning or 
ideal theories which do not make direct reference to the actual state of affairs. 
Reciprocally, conservative theories display an attitude of trust to the traditional and 
familiar and are suspicious of change. Finally, the state is conceived as an organic 
whole of which individuals are constituted parts: the human being is social through 
and through and not because of some mythological choice to cooperate with others. 
He or she is born into a state just as he or she is born to parents and just as parents 
supply a genetic code and an education, so society supplies the material and 
cultural possibility of human living. Any superficial reading of Hegel's political 
thought will be able to locate both textual and substantial evidence that supports 
these three aspects of his system. Moreover, the three characteristics are constants 
throughout the life of his political writings, from the early Jena texts (as the 
repercussions of the French Revolution were almost literally knocking on his door) 
to the mature politics of his Heidelberg and Berlin days (as he was involved in the 
Realpolitik of the educational academy).  
Hegel was politically sceptical of the use of abstract reasoning since, for him, 
human reason is too vacuous to generate actual determinations of the will without 
recourse to substantial natural, social or linguistic content. Reason can tell the 
agent to respect others but not what constitutes such respect in the actual social 
world. Knowing of that kind involves a situated subject immersed in social 
customs and immediate obligations. (EG §§ 506-508)
3
 More significantly, 
contradictory determinations of action can seemingly be justified because human 
reason is powerful enough to create plural, coherent system of reasons and such 
contradictions can even be present within the same subject. (EG §§ 509-11; PR 
§140) The reason that the Owl of Minerva flies only at dusk is because the 
rationality of social reasons for action and political institutions is the result of an 
historical process and not a product of the solitary genius's mind thought up in the 
Ivory Tower.  
Traditionalism is the positive reflection of political scepticism: where the latter 
eschews ahistorical thinking, the former is best characterized as faith in the 
familiar and customary to deliver the most commodious form of life, the most 
rational institutions and the best political structures. Political knowledge is 
transmitted from generation to generation and refined through practice and 
exercise. For Hegel, human action should meet the expectations of one's social 
peers (PR §§113-114), right claimed by the subjective conscience should be ruled 
by the demands of what one's social peers would find reasonable (PR §132), the 
political justification of institutions can only take the form of reflection on one's 
own, actual social world (PR pp. 9-23) and the philosophical justification of the 
rationality of a particular state can only be given in terms of its place in the 
historical narrative of self-knowledge of human reason. (EG §§548-552) So, for 
example, we are told that slavery is universally and morally wrong, but it is also a 
necessary and valid institution since only through slavery can a class become 
aware of its power to impose its will on the world and to consent to or negate the 
orders of their masters. (PR §57) 
 And it is clear from the above that Hegel views the individual as a product of 
his or her social existence and historical situation. In short, there is an intimate, 
organic relationship between the society and the individual. It is true for Hegel that 
individual subjects attain their freedom through fulfilling the roles and duties of 
their social stations and he shares with Burke a distrust of radical, individual 
thinking and its revolutionary consequences as well as proposing an account of 
reason that is historically situated. It is the explicit social origin of reasons which 
has led to the diverse interpretations of Hegel's account of the state. On the one 
hand, he has been accused of political quietism, in which the subject is free when 
he fulfils his or her social role, ruling out any possibility of protest in terms of 
moral conscience since to protest is to fail to fulfil one's role. And there is plenty of 
support for such a reading in his thought, if one concentrates on the representation 
of women and their roles, for example. (PR §§165-166) On the other hand, the 
moral conscience is held to be a fundamental and necessary attribute of individuals 
within the rational state and, if individuals do not possess both individuality and 
critical autonomy, then neither is the individual fully free nor the state fully 
rational. (PR §§132, 138) Yet, overstating this supposed opposition negates a very 
compelling account of rational conservatism and it is that account we shall seek to 
reconstruct here. Hegel's concept of Sittlichkeit is precisely the possibility of a 
moral conscience and not its negation, but a moral conscience that must be 
historically situated in order to be both possible and effective. The very 
compatibility of much of Hegel's thought with liberalism often leads to the 
suppression of the conservative elements at the expense of closing off an 
alternative to the binary opposition between liberalism and conservatism. 
What is more interesting than the shallow expression of these three 
characteristics of conservatism, is how a theory organizes their inter-relations. 
Political scepticism and traditionalism are two sides of the same coin, the positive 
and negative aspects of an attitude of trust in the current state of affairs brought 
about through historical processes or an attitude of mistrust of those who dissent 
from the status quo using the justification of universal reason or natural law. 
Attitudes, though, can neither be rational nor irrational, but they can be rationalized 
and replaced with knowledge, just as the veracity of beliefs can dissipate or justify 
one's feelings of fear. One can have trust in the doctor or not, but that attitude can 
be rationalized: does she hold accreditation from the relevant medical authority? 
Has she cured me successfully in the past? Similarly, the trust one shows in a 
political and social state can be rightly or wrongly invested. The advantage of 
liberalism is that it seems to articulate how this attitude is reliable or not: does 
membership of this state increase my welfare? Does it protect my basic rights? 
Hegelian social thought is to be lauded because, not only is it suspicious of claims 
of universal rights and abstract reasoning, it also offers a way for the trust to be 
rationalized. And it does so in a very unliberal way; it does so through making the 
attitudinal postures (scepticism and traditionalism) dependent on the deeper, 
metaphysical theory of organicism. 
 
3 Organicism and moral fabric 
 
Organicism is a social theory which, on the surface, holds that the state exists 
prior to the individual and that the individual is a social production. Yet, there is an 
implicit and deeper point here: the state and its institutions are more than 
instruments of social cooperation. The state of nature mythology at the heart of the 
social contract tradition has always seen society as a compromise or a necessary 
limitation of individual liberty. Hegel, like the communitarians, conservatives and 
socialists, believes that culture is more: it is the medium that makes possible and 
sustains a good. That good is not culture itself, but human freedom and human 
freedom is a social achievement, not an individual property. 
The political scepticism and traditionalism inherent in Hegelian thought already 
commits it to an ideal of the situated moral subject. Objectivity is not to be found 
through the reasoning of a Kantian, abstract person, but rather in the shared 
institutions and practices already existent in the individual's world. For Hegel, an 
agent has a measure of objective freedom which grants him or her the certainty of 
recognition: you will know me as a father if I act in such and such a way, you will 
know me as a lecturer due to my clothing and the books under my arms and so on. 
Without such practices and meanings “out there” in the social world, the agent 
would be unable to express his or her individuality in terms intelligible to others, 
nor be able to evaluate the appearance and actions of others. Without these 
meanings, the human being could make only the most primitive, animalistic aims 
intelligible to others (a point for an object of want, a cry for pain and displeasure 
and so on). He or she would remain bound to immediate desires as the only 
possible expression of liberty. The choice of which desires to pursue comes with 
the capacity to assign articulate value to them and this is made possible through the 
division of a shared culture that materially frees one from immediate desires and 
also culturally liberates the value of things. The substrate of meaning that makes 
individual action and recognition rational to others is what Hegel calls Sittlichkeit. 
In most translations, the word Sittlichkeit remains in its original form with 
apologetic notes from the translator. Such apologies are not necessary though 
because there exists, in colloquial English, the term “moral fabric” which is often 
expressed as the “moral fabric of a culture.” The agent's moral fabric supplies 
motivations and obligations for the agent in virtue of his membership and his role 
in this institutional order. It is the collection of those judgements waiting to be 
applied to one's appearance and actions prior even to their perception or 
performance. When I am at home and put my clothes on, I know what is expected 
from a lecturer (casual, informal), what is permissible, even if idiosyncratic (too 
formal, the use of “mad” bow ties) and what is unacceptable (nudity, shorts). And 
these judgements change with the times, but the cultural medium is–like fabric–
malleable; it twists, turns, fades and is reinvigorated. One can imagine how not so 
long ago jeans on a lecturer would have been as unacceptable as a shellsuit is now. 
Similarly, moral fabric delineates the spheres of prudence and morality, of home 
and work, of public and private and many more. Whether one's choice to smoke is 
a prudential matter (concerning health), a moral matter (the welfare of others) or an 
aesthetic matter (concerning one's image), is dependent on the categories and 
priorities of one's culture. The moral fabric is, though, more: it is the material 
reality of one's existence (the economic and geographical facts of one's existence), 
the formal, political institutions and particular laws and also the embedded 
conventions of morality, etiquette and convention. All three aspects determine the 
life and goals of the individual. 
And such an account of organicism reveals why a conservative is politically 
sceptical and also a traditionalist. Political institutions and individuals actions are 
not subject to the inquiry and rules of science. Political rule and human living are 
both crafts and not exact science. They are more akin to the creation of works of art 
than the techniques of science. If I wish to write a novel, no matter how 
experimental or radical, it has to make reference to the narrative tradition. And if 
that novel is to be evaluated and judged, then it must be done so with concepts and 
categories drawn from the appropriate aesthetic tradition. Such criticism is not a 
limitation of artistic expression or an oppression of individuality, but a necessary 
requirement of objectivity or, if one wishes, the sense of objectivity. The canon 
exists as the storehouse of previous creations and acts of will that remain because 
they are the examples of the best that has been thought and said. The critic has trust 
in the canon and has learnt from the canon. But it is not closed nor fixed. It evolves 
and changes: new works are introduced and older ones are jettisoned. But such 
changes are never made on the basis of supposed abstract reasoning about what 
should or should not belong. Such judgements are made through an immanent 
conversation with the tradition rather than a transcendental appraisal of the 
particular work in isolation. 
Moral fabric is the canon of everyday life. It is the storehouse of previous 
actions, projects and plans. It is the will of the past frozen into political institutions, 
laws and custom. The convention of shaking hands cannot be explained by some 
primitive causal or behavioural theory. The institution is a meaning communicating 
an intention in the same way a word communicates a thought. I wish to be friendly, 
I confer respect on you by taking your hand and I acknowledge you as my equal. 
One need only consider the playful way in which an adult will offer his hand to a 
child to enforce these meanings. The only other way to express such sentiments is 
to express them through language, but just as you must speak my language to 
understand my sentiment, so you must share my moral fabric to fully understand 
my gesture (for some cultures the offering of a hand to shake would be wholly 
alien or, worse, offensive). In this sense, Sittlichkeit is a “second nature”, the world 
is constituted by social rather than natural reasons for action. (PR §151) And the 
substrate of a social context and a moral fabric allows the individual to enjoy life 
without being enslaved to satisfying the necessity of immediate desires such as 
preservation, hunger and thirst. Moreover, the agent's freedom is further increased 
by overcoming his egoism through the recognition of increasing spheres of 
solidarity to others: family members, workers, communities and species. Finally, 
the moral fabric allows the agent to express him or herself as an individual without 
having to include instructions on how he or she should be understood: my bow tie 
is an expression of my wackiness and desire not to be conventional even if I 
admire the virtue of formality.  
Consequently, the subject as a member of this order has an identity which 
motivates him in certain situations: 
 
… subjective freedom exists as the covertly and overtly universal rational will, 
which is sensible of itself and actively disposed in the consciousness of the 
individual subject, whilst its practical operation and immediate universal actuality at 
the same time exist as moral usage, manner and custom where self-conscious liberty 
has become nature. (EG §513) 
 
The substantial identity of the individual agent supplies immediate motivations in 
social situations that are trustworthy and his natural way of acting has been 
augmented and transformed by a social way of acting. This is a liberation: acting 
free of immediate desire and becoming an individual through the medium of social 
convention. Central to the issue is the idea that making liberty into nature reveals 
that it is not a property that humans possess, but rather a project to be achieved. 
Just as the canon supplies the standards of aesthetic judgement that are trustworthy 
(and a budding artist must at first imitate the tradition before expressing his or her 
individuality), so political institutions, social meanings and moral values of a 
culture supply the standards of judgement for everyday life that are trustworthy. 
The subject has “trust” in the objective social order and its rationality in the same 
way that I trust it will rain when I see grey clouds, I personally cannot explain the 
science behind the prediction nor would the science be watertight if I could (and I 
shall not tear up my theory if it happens to fail to rain), but I can base my actions 
on it because it is a reliable judgement transmitted form the past. (EG §525, PR 
§147) The moral fabric is both the objective social order embedded in institutions 
and also the substantial identity of the agent as a member of these institutions. 
The structures of a social, moral fabric make possible the satisfaction of 
rational desires, projects and aspirations much like the aesthetic canon makes 
possible the appreciation of works of art and an articulation of their worth. The 
liberal conscience, similarly, is only possible given the right set of historical 
conditions. But its justification is only possible as an historical narrative, not an 
empirical or a priori given. Or so the next section will demonstrate. 
 
4 History and justification 
 
 So far, it has been shown that a conservative political theory is possible and 
plausible in that organicism can account for political obligations and there is 
empirical, psychological support for assuming that an agent's culture supplies 
motivations that determine his or her axiological framework and system of needs. 
It remains to be shown that, as a system of justification, it is preferable to 
liberalism and that it can resist the challenge of quietism. In fact, it is superficially 
at a disadvantage since liberalism has a mode for rationalizing trust in custom and 
authority but does so at the expense of tradition in favour of transcendental 
standards of right. That conservative theory is suspicious of such abstract reasoning 
is a moot point unless it can offer a preferable alternative to the justification of the 
values used in practical reasoning. The reasons why the Hegelian justification of 
the values of contemporary culture is preferable to liberalism is two-fold: one, that 
the moral conscience is supported by and integral to the most rational form of 
political culture and, two, a consideration of the metaphysical status of moral 
statements. 
 If a political institution is proposed as just, then it is immediately measured 
against the shared intuitions of a culture. So, democracy is justified because it is 
the best expression of personal, individual autonomy and everyone would agree 
that personal autonomy is something that is worth maintaining and promoting. But, 
if asked why personal autonomy is so important or more important than, say, social 
order or the protection of public property, the conservative would simply answer 
because it is something that this culture happens to value. The liberal, on the other 
hand, would be able to adopt a position of moral realism (it is true that autonomy is 
a good), indirect utilitarianism (general welfare is best maximized by the 
promotion of autonomy) or proceduralism (autonomy is one of those things that an 
agent in a position of impartiality would agree is universal). In short, the liberal (of 
whatever ilk) is able to justify through the use of standards independent of the 
culture itself, not just because we as a culture happen to think they are worthwhile 
values. And that means in cases when a group is persecuted or a minority is denied 
equal treatment according to values upheld by a particular culture, liberalism can 
describe it as a bad culture whereas conservatism, seemingly, cannot. 
 Hegelian conservatism differs from the simple form of conservatism in that it is 
not the case (as one feels Oakeshott, Walzer and Croce would hold) that the values 
of liberalism just happen to be the values of our culture. For Hegel, it is not just 
that we can trust the moral fabric of modern, Western culture, but that such a moral 
fabric is better than others because it does support autonomy and equality. And a 
culture that supports freedom and equality is better than other cultures because not 
only can the individual act on motivations that are liberating but he or she can 
reflect on such reasons and appropriate them as his or her own. The storehouse of 
values and conventions in modern culture are different from those of other cultures 
because these values remain reflective even if they are not reflected upon. This 
difference is probably best illustrated by Hegel’s own distinction between 
reflective (the state) and unreflective trust (the family). 
 When a mother sees her child's life is in danger, she unreflectively sacrifices 
her own safety in order to protect the child. To do so is human and naturally so. 
Reflection on such an altruistic (and the adjective itself is tellingly somewhat 
inappropriate) action would not reveal any deeper, rationally structured reason. 
Why do we protect our children or, less rhetorically, satisfy their material needs? 
Simply because that is what one does. And one naturally does it. Social 
motivations can be as unreflective as these natural ones. So, for example, my 
support of the Aston Villa football team motivates certain behaviour and is the 
ground of many attitudes and emotions, but it cannot meet the demands of any 
rationality. Why do I support Aston Villa? Just because I do, but that support 
constitutes a substantial part of my identity. There exist explanations of why I 
support Aston Villa, based on particular, social and geographical luck: my place of 
birth, my first football match, the first kit bought for me and so on, and those 
contingent facts bear on my identity. Trust in my family members is equally 
unreflective: I trust them just because they are my family members. There is no 
real reason to articulate.  
 The reflective trust in the state, however, is open to scrutiny unlike that of the 
family because of its rational structure. Many social motivations can be reflected 
upon because they can be articulated and shared. The convention of wearing a 
helmet when one cycles is prudential and based in good reason, yet children are 
indoctrinated into such a practice through peer pressure and the use of desirable 
cartoon characters adorned on the objects due to economic aims. The children trust 
that such a convention is rational in the same way they trust their parents with 
other decisions. The children want, and immediately so, what they should 
rationally want and it is this reconciliation through moral fabric of what the 
individual wants and what he or she should want that is the very making of liberty 
into nature.  
 
It is perfectly sensible to demand a justification of a particular law, social duty 
or more and why I should act in accordance with it. The point is, agents rarely do 
demand justification and as such express a reflective trust in their state which is 
just to say, its laws and institutions are open to legitimation and the state must 
make the scrutiny by the agent possible. However, what differs between modern, 
liberal culture and, for example, Ancient Greek or Roman culture, is that for the 
first time the organic relation between the individual and the state is a reflective 
rather than an unreflective one. Other cultures, those without autonomy and 
equality, are more akin to the motivations of a football fan and even if their legal 
structures are rational, the agent is unable to be aware of their rationality. As such, 
there can be no reconciliation of what I want and what I should want, even if the 
two may well be identical due to simple social luck. The difference between the 
hero and the normal person may well be the moral luck of happening to be in the 
presence of a burning orphanage. Similarly, the difference between the partially 
free human and the fully free human may well happen to be being born in the right 
culture. Autonomy and equality are the values, substantiated in specific institutions 
and social structures as well as being revered by the consciousness of the 
community, which make possible and promote the reflective attitude which is 
necessary for the recognition and appropriation of the motivations of my moral 
fabric as my own. The appropriation of these motivations of my own is the 
replacement of a natural identity with a social one which is, as Hegel tells us, self-
conscious liberty. And this can only happen within a liberal culture. 
 So, like liberalism, Hegelian conservatism is able to assert that some cultures 
(precisely those which make possible the individual reflection and appropriation of 
social motivations as one's own) are better than others and that the values of our 
culture are not ones we just happen to possess, but ones that are justified above 
those of other cultures. Moreover, Hegelian conservatism, unlike liberalism, does 
not assume such values can be derived by abstract reason, but only through the 
processes of history and then be known to the consciousnesses of individuals who 
reflect on their culture. It is disingenuous to “transcendentally” assert that all 
freedom requires is political institutions which support autonomy and equality 
because only when history has produced those institutions which reconcile wants 
and duties in reflective trust can one become aware of the formal conditions of free 
existence. To illustrate this, imagine choosing to build a house. The choice of 
materials, direction and plan of the building, the height of ceilings and type of roof 
could be chosen arbitrarily and spontaneously, but to do so is to run the risk of 
constructing something that is unliveable. The needs and demands of the 
geographical location and its climate and the responses to such demands are 
“stored” in the buildings that surround one. The past knowledge is transmitted 
through the existence of actual houses and such knowledge can be trusted and 
imitated. Yet, science can be used to justify certain techniques: large windows let in 
too much light, certain stone will retain heat better and new technologies can 
change practices (central heating, for example). The trust is reflective because there 
exists the possibility to apply reason to custom, but reason cannot a priori think up 
the rules for building, the tradition reveals what is to be tested. The best culture is 
the one in which reason can be applied to the actual structures and laws in order to 
justify one's trust. 
 And by relocating the liberal/conservative opposition to the problem of 
justification, it becomes apparent that the opposition rests upon a very simple 
dichotomy in political thought: Kantianism versus Hegelianism.
4
 The liberal or 
Kantian tradition appeals to standards that are universal, ahistorical and objective, 
it does not matter who you are and where or when you live because there exist 
moral rights which are applicable always, to everyone and everywhere. And such 
universalism is as characteristic of proceduralism and utilitarianism as it is of 
liberal realism: what matters or has value is known a priori and is universal. 
Alternatively, Hegelian theories hold that the categories and values of morality are 
derived from historical and social contexts. There is no view from nowhere from 
which to justify one tradition over another and no appeal to human value beyond 
the communities that confer on it a meaning. The reconciliation of liberalism and 
conservatism occurs with the recognition that the liberal programme is a tradition 
like all others and a rational one, but within limits. It is worthwhile to keep the 
political institutions, but to drop the pretence of universality and objectivity. Yet, 
such a reconciliation still suffers against a full-blooded liberalism when we 
consider cases such as the persecution of a minority and the call for universal 
suffrage; like Hegel's comments on slavery, it is distasteful to describe unfair 
distribution of rights and the exclusion of women from political participation as 
valid in the world where it occurs. We intuitively want more bite from our political 
theories and so conservatism has to offer more. 
 The consideration of history as the ground for justification requires a deeper 
reflection, though. Hegel has a metaphysical account of history which justifies the 
evolution and rationality of a particular moral fabric. Some cultures are better than 
others, but such a judgement cannot be reduced to the mere, formal values of 
liberalism. Why might a conservative want to trust in history? One reason is that 
there is no alternative; that political scepticism leaves no choice but that means that 
the values we possess just happen to be the ones we use in justification. Hegelian 
conservatism has to demonstrate that the historical justification of these values is 
preferable to the liberal justifications: moral realism, utilitarianism and 
proceduralism. 
 History can justify the values of liberalism by assuming that liberal states are 
the end of history and history is the process that sorts the wheat from the chaff of 
political values and social meanings. Such a faith in progress can be empirically 
evidenced in the medical sciences, but it is harder to defend in political science 
especially since the justifications of progress are often value-laden. Whereas a 
liberal is committed to the moral realism of values or, in a more Kantian ilk, 
committed to the universality of values, Hegel eschews both for an historical 
account of truth. His account of history is metaphysical and has to do with the 
nature of moral truth: history is the self-actualization of truth. How is one to 
understand this?  
 The simplest form of liberalism is a moral realism. Such a position would hold 
that the statement “autonomy is valuable” is true in the same way “snow is white” 
is true in that it corresponds to the way things actually are. Although one may be 
willing to entertain that words can stand in for natural facts, it is hard to understand 
what must or must not be for a word to stand in for a normative value. In the first 
case, there is at least a causal story to be told about the interaction between 
perceptual faculties and the world. The moral realist may want to claim that there is 
a special moral faculty that allows individuals to intuit true moral values (akin to a 
mathematical faculty), but they then have to explain the phenomenon of moral 
pluralism. Real values are metaphysically puzzling and moral diversity amongst 
societies is, at least superficially, better explained by a theory consistent with 
Hegelian conservatism and its idea of moral fabric. 
 For this reason, most liberals would look for a coherentist account of truth: 
“autonomy is valuable” is true if all rational beings would agree to the statement. A 
movement, if one likes, from correspondence to intersubjectivity. Hegel, like 
Kant's idealism, moves away from realism to the idea of consensus of rational 
beings: a value is true if it is a value all agents would hold, at all times and in all 
places. This is equally true for both the utilitarian and the proceduralist liberal: 
there is one moral truth (welfare is good) to which all agents would agree, and 
political laws must cohere with this standard. The proceduralist, who assumes that 
agreement is a regulative ideal of all moral discourse, is liberal because agreement 
will be universal and not bounded. Yet, whereas for Kant reason is ahistorical and 
universal, Hegel believes that for knowledge to have substantial content and not 
just formal characteristics, then it must express an historical content. Universality 
gives us only abstract shapes, no substance. In what does welfare substantially 
consist? What actually matters to the agent? And what factors are worthy to be 
discussed at the negotiating table? All these questions require substantial answers 
discoverable only through bringing one's comprehensive and full moral identity 
into discussions, not just an abstract identity in order to compel universal 
agreement. 
 Metaphysically history is the home of truth and the unfolding of political and 
moral progress for Hegel because it is the arena in which the rational demands can 
be answered because the actual requirements have been worked out and 
transmitted from the previous generation. In liberal, Western democracies, such 
transmission is no longer socially lucky because once the values of autonomy and 
equality are institutionally in place, the agent's trust becomes reflective and not just 
immediate. When the jury convicts a criminal because they did not like the look in 
his eyes and he was actually guilty, they do so luckily: their knowledge is lucky (it 
is a mere true, belief). They just happen to have hit on the truth. Only if they had 
proper reasons (evidence, character insights and so on) would their judgement be 
rational. Similarly, if a culture just happens upon better values than an other, its 
members are socially lucky. Only when the members have reasons for supporting 
those values, are those values actually justified. But rationality comes after the 
institutions are already embedded (like the principles of building follow the 
tradition of building). Since liberal communities, because they embed the values of 
autonomy, equality and respect, are best placed to understand other cultures and 
their own, and to express what needs to be improved, in a way other cultures 
cannot  then they are the end of an historical process towards the achievement of 
human freedom. Hegelian conservatism offers an historical justification of liberal 
values that holds them above the values of other cultures, but is aware of the fact 
that they cannot be thought up at an abstract level without history having run its 
course. 
 
5 Conservatism and quietism 
 
 Hegelian conservatism is a plausible theory that, at the justificatory level, is 
preferable to liberalism because it does not rely on intuitionism or metaphysically 
puzzling accounts of value. It is plausible as an account of political theory both 
psychological (as a description of why agents act the way they do and why political 
society is structured the way it is). It can, like liberalism, also normatively compare 
cultures against each other and, it is preferable to liberalism as a theory, because 
the basis of such cultural evaluation does not seem to be circular: the best culture is 
the one which endorses Western values because we do. Rather Western values are 
historically justified because they make possible and sustain human freedom, 
though what human freedom requires cannot be known by a priori reasoning nor 
natural law. For this reason, Hegelian conservatism also avoids the appearance of 
oppression that accompanies liberalism when it applies these values to other 
cultures.  
 However, although the theory may well be theoretically plausible, it still suffers 
from one major, practical disadvantage. It cannot apparently resist the accusation 
of political quietism laid at the door of most conservative theories. To illustrate 
what is at stake let us use a rather relevant example, at least within the domain of 
Hegel's own writings. Let us consider the issue of suffrage and the rights of women 
to possess a vote. In contemporary political discourse, it would be absurd to 
exclude a group from political participation due to an arbitrary and irrelevant 
characteristic. So, biological difference does not have the same significance as 
mental age when considering whether an individual should have the right to vote. 
Grounding our reasoning are a host of intuitions and moral categories that justify 
our beliefs: equality, autonomy, freedom to expression and so on. Mental age 
impairs reason and those below a certain threshold are subject to influence and 
their interests are better protected by proxy through parental decisions. The 
conservative says that these reasons have been transmitted from previous 
generations and developed through historical process and should therefore 
determine our thinking on this issue. 
 Of course, the point is that one hundred years ago the same sort of arguments 
concerning children would have been offered to justify the exclusion of women 
from political participation: they are too emotional to rely on reason, they will be 
unduly influenced and their interests are better protected through head of 
household decisions. Such attitudes were equally the product of historical 
processes and were transmitted from previous generations. The liberal would be 
able to indicate universal rights and values, such as equality and the right to 
property, that will be violated by the exclusion of women from political 
participation. Conservatism needs to show that it has a place for an effective 
individual moral conscience. 
 To a certain extent, the Hegelian response is expected and has already been 
outlined in the preceding paragraphs. If I support a football team, the customs of 
behaviour I inherit–both general and particular–are mere luck, there is nothing 
about them that is my own, nor could there be. However, the obligations and duties 
of my culture are different because they rely on reflective trust: there can exist 
rational structures that support them. For a relationship of reflective trust to exist, 
those rational structures must be accessible to me as an individual and possible of 
articulation as reasons that all members of our culture should share. In other words, 
there ought to exist the individual moral conscience and this is to be supported and 
maintained by a fully rational moral fabric. Otherwise, individuals are not free. 
 The example in point confirms this. The right to vote is one way for me to 
reconcile what I want with what I should want. Only through participating in 
political process and expressing myself in the formation of laws, can I truly feel 
they are my laws. How one is to be reconciled with law in this sense is particular to 
a community, but one which espouses democracy implicitly holds that individuals 
must be responsible for their own laws. Women were not and so, even if the laws 
of society were fair and just, they just happened to be for these agents and were not 
rationally so. Hegelian conservatism, with its commitment to reflective organicism, 
requires that all individuals have access to the rational structures of culture. And 
that reflection takes the form of a conscience that can, when called upon, question 
the structures and values of a community. Political quietism is the face of political 
wrongs is, therefore, contrary to the very movement of history required by cultural 
transmission. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
 Political and philosophical discourse revels in offering binary oppositions in 
order to clarify difficult discussions and to delineate the landscape of discourse. 
Such binary oppositions do as much damage as good though; they obscure or 
misinterpret the more subtle understanding of what actually is at stake. The 
opposition between conservatism and liberalism is not a simple either/or and it is 
one merit of Hegelian social thought that it brings this reflection to the surface. 
Hegel is not best understood as a liberal or a conservative and no thinker worth his 
or her salt fits neatly into the predesignated categories of simple thinking. The 
opposition is not even an opposition, but more a “polysition” between liberalism, 
libertarianism, socialism, communitarianism and so on. To concentrate on two of 
these terms is again a misconstrual of what is at stake. Hegelian thought reminds 
contemporary theorists of their own oversimplifications, but also offers a very 
plausible account of liberal conservatism or conservative liberalism; that is the 
reconciliation between liberal society and its historical emergence. 
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